Take a family bakery in Nicosia. Profitable, well-established, the company owns the building it operates from on a street that has appreciated over the years. The accountant's number is four times last year's three-hundred-thousand-euro EBITDA, one million two hundred thousand. The owner reads the same balance sheet and sees the building, valued at eight hundred thousand on a recent survey. The years of work that built the business in the first place feel like they belong in the price too. The asking number reaches two million. Each piece feels true on its own: the going concern is worth one million two hundred thousand, the building is worth eight hundred thousand, the years deserve recognition. The arithmetic that combines them is the problem. No buyer will sign; some will not open the file. The asking price is not just high, it signals a seller operating on different math, and exit conversations stall because of that signal more often than because of the number itself. The error is universal, the math is the same in every variant, and it sits at the start of more failed exits than any other single cause.

The multiple is the operating business

Start with the basic move. The EBITDA multiple does not price the business next to its operating assets. It prices the operating assets. That is what enterprise value means in standard practice: the market value of the operating assets, taken together, as a going concern. The oven is in there. So are the dough mixer, the recipes, the location, the staff, the customer flow, the supplier relationships, the daily discipline that holds the place together.

Aswath Damodaran has put it more cleanly than most: enterprise value is not a number that sits next to the operating assets, it is the operating assets. An asset-based valuation and a multiple-based valuation are alternative views of the same business, not additive. They do not stack.

Where the line sits in practice

The price the seller receives is not what the buyer pays at the enterprise-value level. The two are connected by a cash-free, debt-free bridge: enterprise value, minus debt, plus surplus cash, plus or minus a working capital adjustment, equals equity value. An investment property, marketable securities, a related-party loan receivable, a development plot unused by the trade, sit on the same balance sheet but are not what the multiple is pricing. They cross the bridge separately or are dealt with before it is built.

Where the line moves is the interesting case. Take a Cyprus manufacturer whose company also owns the workshop building. If the building is used to produce the revenue and an acquirer would have to rent or buy an equivalent to replicate the cash flow, the building is an operating asset. The reconciliation is to impute a market rent into earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation, then either include the building in the sale at appraised value with the rent stream removed, or carve it into a property company on a long lease back. The error the bakery owner makes, and the manufacturer in this position makes too, is to apply the multiple to historic earnings carrying no rent because the company owns the building, and then add the building's market value on top.

The inversion case is the hotel. The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors treats hotels, marinas, petrol stations and care homes as a single thing valued by the profits method: maintainable trade, maintainable operating profit, market multiplier. The bricks-and-mortar value and the going-concern value are alternative views of the same number, not summable views.

Enterprise value is not next to the operating assets. It is the operating assets.

The carve-out is the procedural answer

The owner is not wrong to want the value of the building, or the cash, or the bonds. The mistake is to ask for it inside the multiple. The procedural answer is to put the passive asset on the other side of a pre-sale carve-out, so the operating business is sold at its operating multiple and the passive asset is realised separately at the value an investor in that asset class will pay. The route depends on the asset, the structure of the business, the time available, and the appetite for restructuring.

A dividend in specie distributes the asset directly to the shareholders. Title to the investment property, the share portfolio, or the non-core subsidiary moves out of the company and into the shareholders' personal ownership; the asset is no longer in the data room. The technique is clean where the company has distributable reserves, the deemed disposal at market value carries an acceptable gain, and the transfer reflects market value. Transfers at undervalue are policed by the disguised-distribution rule and by the Cyprus Special Defence Contribution charge that attaches to deemed dividends; the same general anti-abuse perimeter that catches shareholder debit balances reaches an asset moved out at the wrong number.

A group reorganisation works where a dividend in specie does not, often where it cannot. The operating business is hived down into a new subsidiary, or the surplus asset is transferred to a sister company, so that the operating business and the passive asset end up in different companies under the same shareholders. Only the operating business is then offered to the buyer. The reorganisation does not depend on distributable reserves and can be tax-neutral on the transfer itself. The cost is process: a reorganisation plan, board approvals, sometimes tax authority confirmation, and the seasoning period before the new state looks settled to a buyer.

A sale and leaseback handles the case where the operating real estate is the asset to be separated. The company sells the building it occupies to a real estate investor and signs a long lease back. Real estate trades on capitalisation rates while operating businesses trade on earnings multiples; an owned property at a six per cent yield is valued at a multiple no five-times-EBITDA operating business reaches. Carving it out separates the two pricings, gives the owner the cash from the real estate, and lets the operating business go to the operator who wants it. Whichever route is taken, the Cyprus property at the centre of the carve-out carries its own legal-title exposures that surface in any property-side diligence well before completion.

Other routes exist for narrower facts: a clean sale of a surplus property to a third party or related party before completion, a capital reduction. None is universally better than the others. The choice turns on which friction is lowest relative to the value preserved.

Why early matters

The carve-out is best done well before the sale process begins. The practitioner consensus is an eighteen to twenty-four month window. Done in that window the move becomes part of the company's commercial history; the post-restructuring state seasons; the buyer sees the company as it is. Done in the final months the move reads to buyer counsel and to the tax authority as preparation for a sale, which engages general anti-abuse rules, main-purpose tests, and the statutory conditions that disqualify certain reorganisation routes executed in anticipation of a sale. The eighteen to twenty-four month carve-out window sits inside a longer arc where the business is family-owned: the family-side preparation arc typically runs three to five years before that, and the technical carve-out is the last part of it.

The pricing error this article names is the most expensive form of asking the same question late. The seller arrives with a number built on a double count; the buyer reads the same balance sheet and bridges differently; the gap that should have been resolved in the carve-out becomes the gap that kills the deal before it begins. The multiple is the operating business. The passive assets sit elsewhere. The work to move them sits earlier.